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Organizations prepare for crisis communication by design-
ing, implementing, and evaluating procedures, scenarios,
and emergency measures. In addition to crisis communica-
tion, risk communication is a concern for many organiza-
tions as well. Risk communication is viewed as an
interactive, multi-actor democratic process. Traditionally,
risk communication is seen as a linear, top-down, elitist,
expert-to-public approach. In this paper, the relation
between crisis communication and risk communication is
described. In addition, a model is presented based on the
notion that crisis communication should be proactive, and
focusing on the management of the relation between the
organization and its relevant stakeholders or the
organization’s reputation. The new thinking on the risk
communication process is essential for an organization’s
crisis and reputation management.
Introduction
Organizations prepare for crises by designing, implement-
ing, and evaluating procedures, scenarios, and emergency
measures. Usually, this includes working on the content,
structure, and style of particular documents. This prepara-
tory process is part of the crisis control or crisis manage-
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ment. In the process of crisis management the communica-
tion function is an important determinant of its success or
failure. Traditionally, the quality of the crisis communica-
tion plan is seen as the most important determinant of the
success of the crisis communication. However, on review-
ing several crisis communication cases, Marra (1998) advo-
cates that organizations become less dependent on crisis
communication plans. He argues that most plans have the
unlikely premise that every crisis will manifest itself in a way
similar to a previous crisis. This also implies that crisis man-
agement strategies are built on these inadequate and rather
in½exible scenarios. Marra describes several examples of
good planning eventually turning into poor crisis communi-
cation. A well-known example is that of the American space
agency NASA, which adopted a sophisticated crisis commu-
nication plan with a maximum response time of 20 minutes.
In spite of this plan, it took NASA almost 6 hours to come
with a public statement after the Challenger disaster in
1986. The American oil company Exxon had implemented
an elaborate crisis communication plan when the Exxon
Valdez oil spill occurred. It took Exxon no less that 6 days to
formulate a public statement on the situation.
In addition to crisis communication, risk communica-
tion is a concern for many organizations as well. Risk com-
munication focuses on the ½ow of information between
various actors on the probability of the occurrence of nega-
tive consequences of activities, events, or processes. These
consequences include the whole spectrum of threats to indi-
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vidual or societal safety, health, and well-being. Because of
the complexity and vulnerability of the modern technical and
social systems, Beck (1986) characterized modern society as
a risk society. To be able to cope with modern life ad-
equately, the public is very dependent on complex modes of
information transfer, which must be timely, correct, and
complete. This communication process is global in nature.
Although the theoretical and empirical basis of risk
communication is rather thin, more and more studies and
best practices are being documented (Gutteling &
Wiegman, 1996). The domain of risk communication has
existed now for approximately 20 years, and we are already
able to distinguish between traditional approaches and
more recent ideas. In the 1980s, risk management was pri-
marily the domain of government o~cials and experts
working for private enterprises. However, as the systems
involving risks became more complex and opposition to
risks grew, the decision-making on the acceptance of risk
became a problem in the western world. In this situation,
the public expected governments and experts to communi-
cate on risk issues (Otway, 1987). At present, there is a
continuous ½ow of information on risks between experts
and the public. Government at many levels as well as private
companies are designing and implementing various strate-
gies to start and maintain a risk dialogue with their stake-
holders.
In this paper, I will describe the relation between crisis
communication and risk communication. First, I will high-
light some important developments in the area of risk com-
munication with consequences for crisis communication. I
will illustrate these developments with research examples
on the Y2K issue and on modern biotechnology. Second, I
will present a model re½ecting the notion that crisis commu-
nication should be proactive and focusing on the manage-
ment of the relation between the organization and its
relevant stakeholders or the organization’s reputation.
The traditional approach to risk communication
Based on research ¼ndings indicating that di¬erences exist
in risk perception between experts and the lay public, many
experts have argued that the public’s risk perception can be
best characterized as ignorant/irrational, sel¼sh, or prudent
(Freudenburg & Pastor, 1992). Evidently, this assessment of
the public’s risk perception would also guide the traditional
risk communication strategy of government agencies, pri-
vate companies, and scienti¼c experts. Basically, this strat-
egy is: Providing rational, “objective” information to
increase the level of knowledge of the public will change
their “irrational and subjective” opinions (Liu & Smith,
1990, p. 332). From this perspective, the ideal risk commu-
nication is a linear, one-way, expert-to-lay-public process in
which experts persuade laypeople to accept risks. The risk
communication typically contains technical, quantitative, or
statistical information making the point that the risks are at
an acceptable low level. The information presented to the
public is inherently complex and seems to focus primarily
on casting light on the dark side of technological develop-
ments, or to put the risk numbers into context (see
Freudenburg & Rursch, 1994). Rowan (1994) described this
perspective on risk communication as the ‘technical view’ as
opposed to the ‘democratic view’.
Comments to the traditional ‘technical’ approach
The question is whether the transfer of complicated risk
information is su~ciently tailored to the informational
needs and wishes of the public. First, it is conceivable that
the public has problems processing complex risk informa-
tion. Will the public be able to understand technical or sta-
tistical knowledge? Quite a few studies have indicated
problems in this respect (see Gutteling & Wiegman (1996)
for a review of these studies). Further, a rationalistic style
may aggravate the public’s doubts about the real risk magni-
tudes, by accentuating small probabilities but neglecting the
potentially severe consequences. Of course, it is not neces-
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sarily true that providing understandable and credible risk
information will make people accept the conclusions and
recommendations of risk assessors, as the implicit technical
view seems to take for granted.
The technical perspective is similar to what Cvetkovich
et al. (1989) have named the Factual Information Model.
According to this model, presenting information will reduce
the discrepancy between actual and subjectively perceived
risk. However, in a critical review Cvetkovich et al. (1989)
have indicated that the information model fails to be an
adequate type of risk communication model due to at least
three faulty assumptions. These are discussed here in some
detail.
The consequences of a rationalistic communication strategy
The ¼rst faulty assumption in this model is that the public
uses the same style of analytic thought to elaborate on risk
messages as expert risk-communication sources do. This is
not very likely. Johnson and Petcovic (1986) observed that
60% of risk analysts would communicate about risks in a
logical, rational, and analytical style. Therefore, according
to these authors, risk analysts would miss three-quarters of
the public because they are on another wavelength. Less
than 20% of the risk analysts would use a style more suited
to the needs of the public.
When communicators persist in applying a rationalistic
communication strategy, the public’s doubts about the true
nature and magnitude of the risk may increase rather than
decrease (Gutteling & Wiegman, 1996). The literature is
abundant with examples of top-down communication in
which public trust in sources of risk communication such
as, for example, government agencies, private companies,
and perhaps even scientists, decreased (see, for example,
Peters et al., 1997). In general, the public perceives these
sources as not very credible (Covello et al., 1987).
Fessenden-Raden et al. (1987, p. 96) noted that when people
suspect or dislike government agencies, they will regard risk
information provided by their o~cials as less ‘true’ than
what people hear from other sources. This lack of trust can
have many causes and is probably deeply rooted in the
public’s previous experiences with these sources or their
organizations. One may feel that government is not very
competent in the risk area, that the interests of certain pri-
vate sector organizations in½uence governmental decision-
making too much, or that government, for political or
strategic reasons, is very much inclined to implement spe-
ci¼c technologies without the public’s consent. On the other
hand, the public may perceive a private company as a compe-
tent source regarding their speci¼c technology and the risks
involved, but nevertheless do not trust their risk communi-
cation e¬orts (see, for example, McCallum et al., 1991). The
public may argue that in most private companies economic
interests preponderate, and therefore they may suspect that
the company’s communication activities are aimed at im-
proving its economic goals, for instance by trying to silence
the opposition. Increasing economic costs by designing ad-
ditional safety measures, providing complete and unbiased
risk information to the public, or allowing the public to
participate in the decision-making about their (hazardous)
activities, may seem counterproductive to the company’s
economic goals. On these grounds, it is not hard to under-
stand why the public sometimes has little faith in the initia-
tives of government agencies or private companies to
communicate about risks.
Rivaling rationalities in the perception of risk
The second faulty assumption of the technical perspective
on risk communication is that the audience perceives reality
in a similar fashion as the (expert) communicator. However,
perceptions of a hazardous reality can be quite di¬erent be-
tween risk experts and laypersons (see, for example, Slovic,
2000). In the early 1980s Fischho¬ et al. (1981a; 1981b)
reported the ¼rst observations of discrepancies in experts’
versus laypeople’s perception of risks. Subsequently, others
also addressed and analyzed this issue (e.g., Otway, 1987;
Kraus et al., 1992; Wiegman et al., 1995). The main purpose
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of these studies was to increase the understanding of public
perceptions of so-called ‘low-probability, high-conse-
quence’ risks in various technological domains (nuclear en-
ergy, chemical industries, etc.). An important outcome of
these studies was that ‘subjective’ determinants are best to
describe lay perceptions of risk. In short, laypeople will
worry most about risks when the perceived level of threat is
high, the risk is unfamiliar, people cannot control the risk
themselves, and are exposed to the risk involuntarily. There-
fore, laypeople are probably most interested in the individual
consequences of the risk (see, for example, Slovic, 2000). In
contrast, experts’ opinions are mainly based on ‘objective,’
statistical, actuarial data, which focus on societal, but not on
individual consequences. Margolis (1996) refers to these
two notions as the rival rationalities view. Douglas and
Wildavsky (1982) indicated that the understanding of risk
should also focus on social and cultural processes, which
also determine people’s perception of risks. The ‘social am-
pli¼cation model’ also underscores these aspects as well as
the interaction with institutional processes (Kasperson et
al., 1988). Slovic (2000) pointed out that many mechanisms
might contribute to the social ampli¼cation of risks, such as
media coverage, the agendas of various stakeholders (e.g.,
environmentalists), and the signal value of an incident for
the assessment of the magnitude of a risk.
Considering these opposing views on experts and layper-
sons in the context of risk perception, we decided to design a
study enabling us to assess several of the above subjective risk
perception indicators with representatives of both groups
(Gutteling & Kuttschreuter, in press). For several reasons, we
assumed that the so-called Millennium bug would be an
excellent case study to focus on the role of expertise in risk
communication. The Millennium bug shared many charac-
teristics with other so-called ‘low-probability, high-conse-
quence’ technology-related risks. Computer experts
confronted the public with the pessimistic idea that on 1
January 2000 the Millennium bug would cause the hardware
and software of essential computer systems to behave in
unreliable and unpredictable ways. Because computer tech-
nology has become an essential part of the industrialized
world, this risk scenario was supposed to a¬ect all sectors of
society. The Millennium bug was ¼rst and foremost a serious
economic issue, but many risk scenarios described potential,
cumulative health and safety consequences. Without proper
mitigation, the consequences of the Millennium bug were
expected in the ¼nancial and business world, military and
health care organizations, nuclear power plants, the chemi-
cal industry, the energy supply, the transport sector, in small
and medium-sized businesses, and ¼nally in people’s homes.
The results of this study indicated that several months before
the bug was supposed to become active, several di¬erences
indeed existed between laypeople and experts in risk percep-
tion and risk behavior. Laypeople worried more, did see the
issue as more personally risky, and did think the level of
public awareness was higher than experts did. Compared to
laypeople, computer experts felt more capable of taking miti-
gating actions, and they were more convinced that these
actions were adequate. Although these di¬erences were in
the direction we had expected, in absolute terms they were
rather marginal because the majority of the laypeople and the
experts did not perceive the Millennium bug to be a major
threat. We observed no di¬erences between laypersons and
computer experts with respect to the estimated probability of
occurrence of the negative consequences of the Millennium
bug, the assessed riskiness for society, and the assumed level
of expert awareness of the problem. Additionally, laypersons
and computer experts did not show di¬erent levels of inten-
tion to take risk-mitigating actions.
These results lead to the conclusion that the rival ratio-
nalities perspective was only partly supported with respect
to this particular risk issue. Rather unexpected was our ¼nd-
ing that laypersons and computer experts alike blamed com-
puter people for the problem, and remarkably, laypeople
expressed more trust in Millennium-proof claims for ma-
chines and organizations than computer experts did. Com-
pared to experts, laypeople were more convinced that
government agencies should do more to inform the public
about the Millennium risk. This result seems to be in line
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with the somewhat higher level of worry of laypeople. Per-
haps this is an indication that laypeople were convinced that
risk communication could diminish the level of worry for a
risk like the Millennium bug. Not surprisingly, computer
experts had a signi¼cantly more positive attitude toward the
computer technology than the laypersons. However, the at-
titude of laypersons was also very positive, indicating that
this domain of technology is not disputed.
Are risks always apolitical?
This last result ¼ts with the third and ¼nal faulty assumption
in the technical view of risk communication as observed by
Cvetkovich et al. (1989). The factual information model
wrongly assumes that risks are — by de¼nition — apolitical.
As Roger Kasperson (1986) has noted, the simple transfer of
risk information often becomes a political issue about the
more fundamental risk questions. This may be particularly
the case when the technology causing the risks is disputed,
which is not always the case, as we have just seen in the
Millennium bug example. Elaborating on Kasperson’s no-
tion, risk communication on a politically controversial tech-
nology should focus on citizens’ evaluations of the political
process. Important factors here are the individual’s values
concerning procedural fairness, the way in which society
reaches judgments and decisions, and distributive fairness,
how fairly risks and bene¼ts are distributed over di¬erent
groups in society. These judgments of fairness are impor-
tant in the democratic perspective on risk communication
(see Rowan, 1994). Rules that guarantee a just and fair pro-
cess, in which all parties have maximum participation and
decision-making power, govern the democratic model. In
the democratic view, persuasion is out of the question, par-
ticularly for governmental or industrial bodies, because the
aim of communication should be mutual understanding and
not the exertion of power. Sometimes people perceive it as
manipulation when communication professionals use so-
phisticated persuasive techniques to in½uence people’s risk
attitudes in these fundamental issues, and this perception
will lead to resistance and will decrease the level of public
trust or increase public outrage. Scholars have described the
concern for the manipulative nature of risk communication
as well. Heath and Nathan (1990–91) pointed out that
“Sources of risk information not only try to control risk
decisions but [the] availability and interpretation of risk in-
formation as well”. Some even fear risk communication is
always manipulative: “Risk communication is often a code
[word] for brainwashing by experts or industry” (Jasano¬,
1989). Witte (1994) stated: “By virtue of framing messages
in a certain manner, in a certain order, with a certain amount
of information, communicators manipulate receivers into
certain mind-sets — sometimes intentionally and some-
times unintentionally”.
Toward a new perspective on risk communication
Thus, risk communication should not be seen as a top-down
activity in which experts educate the public about risks but
rather as an interactive process characterized by a multi-
actor ½ow of information on risks and the meaning each
actor attributes to the risks. This ½ow of information goes
back and forth between such stakeholders as academic ex-
perts, policy makers, interest groups, private companies,
and the public. Such an approach is the best approximation
of the democratic perspective. The democratic and the tech-
nical views are based on di¬erent underlying views on public
participation processes: democratic or elitist, respectively
(Rowan, 1994). The democratic view is based on the claim
that the public should be in the position to in½uence the risk
decisions that a¬ect their lives directly (Renn et al., 1995).
The open dialogue is the basic assumption for the commu-
nication process. Only in such circumstances can public
participation lead to a greater responsiveness and legitimacy
of organizations and help reduce or resolve con½icts in the
risk area (Fiorino, 1990). The elitist view highlights deci-
sion-making by the few bright persons who possess the
relevant expertise and knowledge (Renn et al., 1995).
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Public involvement in risk decision-making
The public’s desire to participate in risk decision-making is
not just a scholarly frame of mind. The results of a study we
performed on modern biotechnology also support this no-
tion (De Jong et al., 2000). This study, which focused on
decision-making and information ½ows on this issue,
pointed out that the public claims a place in this process.
Figure 1 presents the public’s views on both the observed
and desired levels of in½uence by various stakeholders on
biotechnology decision-making. Stakeholders are the pub-
lic itself, the news media, nongovernmental organizations
(consumer organizations, nature and environmental orga-
nizations, animal welfare organizations, and religious orga-
nizations), government, the private sector, and the scienti¼c
community.
As Figure 1 indicates, the respondents in this study
would like to have a higher level of in½uence on decision-
making for government, nongovernmental organizations,
and the public itself. The present level of in½uence of non-
governmental stakeholders and the public is seen as rather
small. Less than 30% of the respondents have the opinion
that these stakeholders have much in½uence in the biotech-
nology debate. On the other hand, the public feels that in the
present situation the scienti¼c community and the private
sector have a lot of in½uence. Of the respondents, 90% and
76% attributed much in½uence to these stakeholders, re-
spectively. According to the public, however, the power base
for these stakeholders should be reduced. So, while more
than 90% of our respondents prefer government to have
control, only 65% of them want science to have power, and
only 26% is in favor for much private sector in½uence. The
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Figure 1 Public perception of present and wanted in½uence in decision-making processes in modern biotechnology.
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respondents of the study by De Jong et al. (2000) also wanted
the in½uence of the news media reduced.
Information ½ows precede decision-making and partici-
pation by the public on risk issues. So we asked the same
respondents to evaluate how good a job the organizations
mentioned previously do in informing the public (Figure 2).
According to the respondents, the news media do the best
here, which is probably not very surprising. Approximately
65% has the opinion that the news media carry su~cient
information on the developments of modern biotechnology.
Most remarkable is the low number of respondents who feel
that government is providing enough information on these
developments. According to our respondents, then, govern-
ment falls short in this area, which may be seen as a problem
because of the important role attributed to the government in
the decision-making process. Even fewer people feel that the
information provided by private companies is su~cient.
Nongovernmental organizations and the scienti¼c commu-
nity could do better jobs in this respect as well.
Crisis and risk communication with respect to
reputation management
All organizations have internal and external stakeholders,
among them customers, investors, employees, the general
public, governmental organizations, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, news media, etc. All stakeholders may have an
in½uence on the organization’s performance, particularly in
the typical risk and crisis issues of health, safety, and well-
being. For this reason more and more organizations want to
communicate with their stakeholders on these issues. In
many cases, the existence of risks may have negative conse-
quences for the organization’s reputation, credibility, and
internal and external legitimacy. Reputation is the percep-
tion of the organization by its relevant stakeholders. It com-
prises an a¬ective, emotional, or rational reaction toward
the (name of the) organization in terms of strong or weak,
good or bad, positive or negative (Fombrun, 1996). Reputa-
tion management and more in particular the organization’s
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Information sufficient Information insufficient
News media
Government
Non governmental organisations
Scientific community
Private sector
Figure 2 Public’s perception of the information transfer on modern biotechnology of  various sources to the public.
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communication will have to aim at securing these vital orga-
nizational aspects and to improve the external legitimacy of
the organization. Organizations with a sound reputation
have several advantages over other organizations. They usu-
ally have more control over their income and costs, are able
to employ better quali¼ed and more supportive personnel,
they have more credit with their customers, and are less
likely to su¬er reputation damage in case of a sudden crisis
(Fombrun, 1996). Stakeholders perceive organizations with
a good reputation as good employers, excellent invest-
ments, producers of top-quality goods or services, and as
behaving from a clear sense of social responsibility.
An integrated crisis and risk communication model
Several years ago Kreps (1986) described crisis management
as “the use of public relations to minimize harm to the orga-
nization in emergency situations that could cause the orga-
nization irreparable damage”. Just a few years ago Francis
Marra (1998) published his crisis PR-model, which illus-
trates the interrelation of crisis communication and risk
communication, and which focuses on the management of
the reputation of the organization as the main objective of
these types of communication. Figure 3 presents an adapted
version of the model.
This model de¼nes the outcome of a crisis communica-
tion process in terms of the relation between an organiza-
tion and its relevant stakeholders before and after the crisis.
If the previous relation between the organization and its
stakeholders is good and therefore the reputation of the
organization is positive, then the crisis will not jeopardize
the strategic goals of the organization (Fombrun & Rindova,
2000). In case of a bad reputation with some or all of the
organization’s stakeholders due to a bad relation, the orga-
nization has a problem in times of crisis. Other important
factors are the communication culture in the organization
and the level of autonomy granted by the organization to the
communication department. In the original model, Marra
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stakeholders (e.g. news media)
Risk communication
Preparation of crisis
communication
Relation with
relevant
stakeholders before
the crisis occurs
Crisis
communication is
being applied
Relation with
relevant
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organisation
Autonomy of the
communication sta¬ in
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Figure 3 Adaptation of the Marra (1998) Crisis-PR Model.
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did not speci¼cally focus on the in½uence news media may
have on the relation between an organization and its stake-
holders. Because crisis and risk communication by de¼ni-
tion are part of a societal context, in which the journalistic
processes are important modes of information transfer, as
we have seen in our study on modern biotechnology, we felt
it necessary to adapt Marra’s model in this respect.
Marra (1998) sees risk communication as an opportu-
nity for organizations to actively work on their relation with
relevant stakeholders. The developments in the chemical
industry may be an illustration of this point of view. For
many years, the chemical industry encountered risk and ex-
ternal legitimacy problems. Their response was the so-
called Responsible Care Program, which originated in
Canada in the early 1980s. After the Bhopal disaster involv-
ing the American company Union Carbide and the soil pol-
lution scandal at Love Canal, the American chemical
industry also adopted the plan. It is evident that these and
other disastrous events caused the external legitimacy of the
chemical industry to be at its lowest ebb worldwide. In a
Dutch study at the end of the 1980s it was found that only
15% of the population was sympathetic toward the chemical
industry (Meulblok, 1996). With the adoption of the Re-
sponsible Care Program, the chemical industry accepts its
social responsibility and professes to strive for improve-
ments in the areas of health, safety, and the environment. An
important part of this program is that all people working in a
company are involved in these improvements and the imple-
mentation of quality programs. Companies like to commu-
nicate with their stakeholders about the results of these
improvements. In many cases, this communication may
take place in so-called Community Advisory Panels, which
consist of a group of neighbors of the company and other
stakeholders who on a regular basis discuss with company
o~cials issues of public concern relating to the company.
Environment, safety, and social issues are key topics on the
agenda of these meetings. The Community Advisory Panel
has many of the characteristics of the democratic approach
to risk communication.
Working on a better reputation for better crisis and risk
communication
We strongly contend that an organization should put a su~-
cient amount of e¬ort into creating a relation with the rel-
evant stakeholders before some crisis may occur. In our view
it is evident that the best way for organizations to work on
this relation is to adopt the assumptions and practices that
are characteristic of what we have called the democratic ap-
proach. Therefore, probably the most important aspect of
crisis communication takes place before a crisis strikes, and
not, as common sense logic or the technical-elitist approach
may suggest, during or after the crisis. This implies that
crisis communication is not just a reactive or a defensive
phenomenon and not as is sometimes argued ‘risk commu-
nication in a hurry’. On the contrary, adequate crisis
communication focuses primarily on preventive, proactive
activities which enable the organization to start communi-
cating with relevant stakeholders at a more unhurried pace.
This pacing creates an opportunity for the organization to
get an idea of the company’s reputation with these stake-
holders, to monitor important developments, and to be able
to come to adjustments in policies when needed. In the
organizational literature we ¼nd many accounts of the posi-
tive e¬ects of an open approach and the in½uence of the
external surroundings on organizational performance indi-
cators, such as its reputation, its earning capacity, and its
external legitimacy (see, for example, Fombrun & Rindova,
2000). E¬ective risk communication with its positive in½u-
ence on the organization’s reputation may even have a cush-
ioning e¬ect on the negative reactions after an incident or a
crisis (Fombrun, 1996). On the other hand, ine¬ective or
nonexistent risk communication may be counterproductive.
We have argued that risk communication operating out of
the technical view is probably ine¬ective. Lofstedt and Renn
(1997) perceive the crisis Royal Dutch Shell experienced in
1995 during the so-called Brent Spar a¬air as a classic ex-
ample of ‘Risk communication gone wrong’. The contro-
versy surrounding the plans by Shell and Exxon to dump the
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Brent Spar in the Atlantic is attributed to several factors,
among which Shell’s complete lack of insight into the
societal environmental concerns and the total lack of an
open dialogue with the public. This particular case made
Shell and other private sector organizations aware of their
vulnerability to these societal reactions and pushed them to
re½ect on other strategies for coping with these situations.
For Shell this process resulted in a signi¼cant change from
a defensive / reactive mode of operation to an accommodat-
ing/ proactive risk communication strategy (Fombrun &
Rindova, 2000).
Some final remarks
Finally, an important aspect of the current model is that the
communication culture in the organization and the au-
tonomy of the communication department are crucial to the
adequate handling of crisis communication. The communi-
cation culture is dependent on the climate, and the ideology
or philosophy of the organization. When the dominant cul-
ture in the organization is skeptical of the feasibility of ad-
equate risk communication, e.g., due to con½icting notions
about the participation of stakeholders in the risk decision-
making, it will be di~cult for the organization to maintain
these activities for a longer period. The dominant culture also
determines the organization’s perception of what is the best
relation with the relevant stakeholders, and the choice of the
crisis and risk communication strategy. When the communi-
cation department lacks organizational autonomy, it will be
di~cult for it to operate adequately and autonomously from
its own responsibility and expertise when there is a crisis. In
situations of normal operation, when communication activi-
ties aim at building and maintaining relations with relevant
stakeholders, communication is ideally a di¬racted responsi-
bility of all managers and many of the employees within the
organization (Gurabardhi & Gutteling, 2001).
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